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How Business Shapes Law: A Socio-Legal Framework
GREGORY C. SHAFFER
Much legal scholarship addresses law in terms of norms and
incentives that affect business and individual behavior. This Article
addresses the mechanisms through which business shapes law. There are
two main ways in which business does so. First, business influences the
public institutions that make and apply law. Second, business creates its
own private legal systems, including private institutions to enforce
privately-made law. These two sources of law, publicly-made and
privately-made, are interpenetrated; they reciprocally and dynamically
affect each other. This Article provides a socio-legal framework for
analyzing business’s interactional relationship with law. The Article
argues that to assess the relation of business to law, we must look at three
sets of institutional interactions: the interaction among public institutions
(legislative, administrative, and judicial processes), in each of which
business plays a critical role; the interaction of national and transnational
institutional processes, with transnational processes having become more
prominent; and the interaction among these public institutional processes
and parallel private rule-making, administrative and dispute settlement
mechanisms that business creates. The dynamic, reciprocal interaction of
public and private legal systems constitutes the legal field in which
economic activity takes place.

147

ARTICLE CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 149
II. BUSINESS AND THE PUBLIC LEGAL SYSTEM ............................. 153
A.
B.
C.
D.

BUSINESS AND LEGISLATION............................................................... 154
BUSINESS AND ADMINISTRATION ........................................................ 155
BUSINESS AND THE COURTS ................................................................ 157
NEGOTIATION IN THE LAW’S SHADOW ................................................ 160

III. THE PRIVATE LEGAL SPHERE........................................................ 162
A. ALTERNATIVE CHOICES FOR PRIVATELY-MADE LAW ......................... 162
B. THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE INTERNAL POLICIES:
EXPANDING AND CURTAILING LAW’S REACH ................................ 164
IV. DYNAMIC INTERACTION: PUBLIC LAW IN
THE SHADOW OF BUSINESS PRACTICE ...................................... 169
V. BUSINESS AND LAW IN GLOBAL AND
COMPARATIVE CONTEXT .............................................................. 172
A. THE MAKING OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW ............................................. 172
B. THE RECEPTION OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW ......................................... 176
VI. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 182

How Business Shapes Law: A Socio-Legal Framework
GREGORY C. SHAFFER*
I. INTRODUCTION
As part of their professional pedigree, lawyers are taught to view their
discipline as autonomous. Law has its specialized language—such as
“consideration,” “tort,” “eminent domain,” and “mens rea.” Law has its
specialized mode of reasoning, in which student-apprentices learn to
distinguish factual contexts, judicial dicta, and legal holdings to construct
and parse rhetorical arguments and defend different angles of a question.
And law has its perfomativity, whether in opening or closing arguments in
a courtroom, the deposition of an opponent in a law office, or the
interviewing of a client in which the lawyer hones toward the crux of a
legal issue, disregarding events and feelings that have no legal
implications. Yet this view of law’s autonomy—the insider view—is
narrow and naive to an outsider who views law’s performance from a
sociological vantage. Social forces give rise to law’s construction and they
mediate law’s application which, in turn, shapes law’s reconstruction. Law
faces a dilemma regarding its legitimacy which gives rise to its Janus-faced
nature, looking both inside and outside simultaneously. Law’s legitimacy
depends both on a perception of legal autonomy (an internal view of the
consistency and coherence of applied legal concepts) and a perception of
legal responsiveness (an external view of the social context in which law
operates). Without autonomy, law violates basic strictures of the “rule of
law.” Without responsiveness, law alienates its subjects.
This Article puts business center stage as a means to understand law
because business is a common feature of most areas of law,1 and because,
as a consequence, business is central to law’s construction and reception.
Moreover, the proliferation of privatized legal systems and international
*

Melvin C. Steen Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School, and Fernand Braudel
Senior Fellow, European University Institute (Florence). I would like to thank the University of
Minnesota Law School and the European University Institute for their research support; Fabrizio
Cafaggi, Howard Erlanger, Tom Ginsburg, Claire Hill, Herbert Kritzer, Stewart Macaulay, Brett
McDonnell, Randall Peerenboom, Joachim Savelsberg, Joanne Scott, Veronica Taylor, and the
participants at a workshop at the European University Institute for their comments and suggestions; and
Katie Staba, Carla Kupe, Kyle Shamberg, Ryan Griffin, Mary Rumsey, and Suzanne Thorpe for their
research assistance. All errors, of course, remain my own. A separate version of this Article will
appear in a chapter in The Oxford Handbook of Business and Government (David Coen, Wyn Grant,
Graham Wilson, eds.) (forthcoming 2010).
1
To name a few commonly taught subjects in law schools, these areas include contract law, tort
law, commercial law, corporate law, antitrust law, labor and employment law, consumer law,
environmental law, health law, insurance law, intellectual property law, administrative law, civil
procedure, and constitutional law.
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and transnational institutions challenge our very concept of law. We need
a socio-legal analytic framework to understand the relationship of business
(driven by a quest for profit) and law (characterized by both reason and
coercion) to understand how law operates.
There is a great deal of scholarship that addresses different aspects of
the business-law relationship, from which this Article builds and to which
it contributes. We lack, however, an overarching socio-legal analytic
framework to assess the dynamic interaction of public and private business
lawmaking in different institutions at the national and international levels.
Lon Fuller earlier put forward a general interactional theory of law.3 In
Fuller’s words, law and society are linked in a mesh of “interactional
expectancies.”4 With respect to statutory law:
The interpretation of statutes is, then, not simply a process of
drawing out of the statute what its maker put into it but is
also in part, and in varying degrees, a process of adjusting the
statute to the implicit demands and values of the society to
which it is to be applied.5
With regard to common law judging, as Gerald Postema writes in respect
of Fuller’s theory:
Through sensitivity to the underlying practices and
understandings, and articulation of principled justifications
for their decisions, courts sought to anticipate the ways in
which ordinary citizens would take up their decisions, while
the citizens were forced to understand the general import of
the decisions in such a way as to anticipate how the courts
would decide future cases as they may affect their lives.6
Fuller, however, did not focus on business’s role, including its part in the
creation of private legal systems.
This Article applies an institution-centered analytic framework to
2
See Neil Walker, Out of Place and Out of Time: Law’s Fading Co-ordinates 23–26 (U.
Edinburgh Sch. L., Working Paper Series No. 2009/01, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1367591, at 33–34 (“State law, including the frame of state constitutional law, is increasingly
rivaled by law otherwise spatially extended, including sub-state law, regional supranational law,
transnational domain-specific private ordering, hybrid public-private ordering, and, increasingly, new
forms of global legal regime that neither claim universality nor obviously emanate from nor respect the
aggregate sovereign will.”).
3
Lon L. Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, 14 AM. J. JURIS. 1, passim (1969); see also
Gerald Postema, Implicit Law and Principles of Legality, in LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY, PART ONE: THE COMMON LAW WORLD (forthcoming 2010) (citing LON L. FULLER, THE
PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER (Kenneth I. Winston ed., rev. ed.
2001)).
4
Fuller, Human Interaction, supra note 3, at 14; see also LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAW 221–23 (2d ed. 1969).
5
LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 59 (1968).
6
Postema, supra note 3.
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address the reciprocal interaction of business and law, maintaining that one
cannot be understood without the other. Law consists of systems of rules,
standards, and procedures created and applied by social institutions which
constitute business (by recognizing business charters) and which provide a
framework in which business strategizes and operates.7 Business, in turn,
uses law as a resource to advance and defend business aims, shaping law in
various direct and indirect ways.8 While much legal scholarship addresses
public and private legal ordering as distinct domains9 and assesses law in
terms of norms and incentives that affect business and individual
behavior,10 this Article reverses the telescope, providing a framework to
assess the multiple mechanisms through which business reciprocally
shapes law. It applies this framework to empirical examples from an array
of legal domains.
To start with public institutions, business has advantages over other
constituencies before them, be they legislatures, administrative bodies, or
courts. Each of these institutions may be more or less propitious for
business at different times and in different contexts, and these institutions,
in turn, can constrain, catalyze, and otherwise affect each other. In
addition, business creates its own private legal systems, including what is
traditionally referred to as lex mercatoria (or private merchant law) and
private institutions to enforce it (such as arbitral bodies).11 These two
7
On the growing pervasiveness of law during the latter half of the twentieth century, as reflected
in more regulation, litigation, number of lawyers and other legal actors, and greater diffusion of
information and public awareness about law, see Marc Galanter, Law Abounding: Legislation Around
the North Atlantic, 55 MOD. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1992); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 6–9 (2002).
8
By business, I refer to all institutional forms, including peak business trade associations, sectoral
lobbying groups, large corporations, and small proprietorships. Although the Article makes clear that
the interests of business with regard to law are rarely, if ever, monolithic, it will at times focus on
business as a whole in this Article to simplify analysis. Corporate organization and state regulation
have both grown dramatically in number and complexity over the last century, with each responding to
the other. On the rise and global diffusion of the corporate form, see JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER
DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 144–45 (2000).
9
See, e.g., NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 256–57 (1995) (discussing
the legal process school and its heritage in the United States, which stresses how the state may adopt a
“hands-off” strategy, leaving issues to “the process of private ordering,” and further noting that
“efficient administration suggests the desirability of maximizing these elements” (citing HENRY M.
HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 870–72 (1958))).
10
Law and economics tends to focus on incentives and default rules, while legal philosophy tends
to focus on law’s normative dimensions.
11
By private legal systems and private law, I mean law made by and through private bodies, as
opposed to traditional contract, property, and family law. Cf. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Public and the
Private in the Provision of Law for Global Transactions, in CONTRACTUAL CERTAINTY IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND THEORETICAL DEBATES ON INSTITUTIONAL
SUPPORT FOR GLOBAL ECONOMIC EXCHANGES 239 (Volkmar Gessner ed., 2009) (focusing on the
private production of law); Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State?
Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 843, 843–44 (2006) (providing
conceptual clarifications of private law in light of processes of globalization and privatization); David
V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371, 375 (2003) (distinguishing “private law” from
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sources of law, publicly-made and privately-made, interact dynamically.
Publicly-made law is made in response to developments in the private
sphere, sometimes addressing privately-made law’s purported deficiencies,
and sometimes codifying or otherwise taking into account private business
law, business custom, and business institutional developments (such as
alternative dispute resolution) into national statutes, regulations, and
institutional practices. Privately-made law is adopted in response to the
public legal system, whether to preempt public law’s creation as
unnecessary, to internalize public law through creating new organizational
policies and procedures (affecting law’s meaning), or to exit from the
public legal system through the development of alternative dispute
resolution bodies. The dynamic, reciprocal interaction of public and
private legal systems at different levels of social organization constitutes
the legal field in which economic activity takes place.
To assess the relation of business to law, one must thus examine how
law is created and applied through public institutions, how it is created and
applied through private entities, and how these systems interact, including
between the national and the transnational levels. That is, one must look at
three sets of institutional interactions: the interaction among public
institutions (legislative, administrative, and judicial processes), in each of
which business plays a critical role; the interaction of national and
transnational institutional processes, with transnational processes having
become more prominent in an economically globalized age; and the
interaction among these public institutional processes and parallel private
rule-making, administrative, and dispute settlement mechanisms that
business creates, again at different levels of social organization. This
analytic framework for assessing the relation of business and law applies
across legal subject areas.
The remainder of this Article is in four parts. Part II examines
business’s role in shaping law through public institutions. Part III assesses
business’s creation of private legal rules and institutions. Part IV analyzes
how public and private legal systems interact, and, in particular, how
private business-made law and business practice affect publicly-made law
over time. Part V addresses the interaction of business and law in the
comparative and global context. It shows how, on the one hand, much of
international business law has developed in response to business demands
and practices, in the process affecting national law. On the other hand, it
explains why national law and legal practice nonetheless retain significant
variation in reflection of local interests, institutional structures, and
business and legal cultures.

“privately made law”).
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II. BUSINESS AND THE PUBLIC LEGAL SYSTEM
Business interests may be united or divided in relation to public
institutions and the laws that these institutions create. Regulation provides
some businesses with competitive advantages over others, dividing
business and creating incentives for different public-private alliances.12
Business is divided on account of economic competition, and public actors
are divided on account of political, ideological and administrative
competition.13 Different factions within business thus ally with different
factions within government. Business interests, however, may also
converge to oppose government measures, as when government sides with
consumer or environmental groups at the national level, and business
believes it will be disadvantaged against foreign competition. With the rise
of transnational institutions, businesses can also look to public actors at
different levels of social organization to promote their interests.
Business and law interact in mutually supportive and mutually
constraining ways. On the one hand, law can significantly constrain
business choice so that business attempts to constrain law’s reach. On the
other hand, law not only helps to stabilize expectations and thus create
greater business certainty, but it also provides legitimacy for business and
business operations, shielding them from fundamental challenges,14 and it
can provide competitive advantages for some businesses over others.15
Business thus invests in law, both to shape law to support business
interests and to legitimize business conduct, as well as to thwart law’s
potential constraints.
Business has a complex relationship with law, which, at a minimum,
must appear autonomous from business or else law lacks legitimacy. Yet
as Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth write, “the autonomy of the law, which
is necessary to its legitimacy, is not inconsistent with serving the needs of
political and economic power.”16 There often exists an “unspoken
12
DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY 1–3 (1995).
13
The division of public actors, of course, depends on a non-autocratic system. See, e.g., ROBERT
A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 63, 78–81 (1956) (setting forth a pluralist theory of
interest groups that distinguishes democracy, or polyarchy, from dictatorship).
14
This is true not only of property and contract law, which facilitate and legitimize business
economic activity, but also of regulatory law more broadly in a capitalist economy. See, e.g., JAMES
WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 1780–1970, 60–61 (1970). As Hurst wrote concerning developments of law affecting business
in the United States, “[b]efore the late nineteenth century questions of legitimacy relating to the
business corporation concerned in the main the legitimacy of the ends and means of government’s
power as it affected corporations, rather than the legitimacy of corporations’ use of the facilities the law
provided for them.” Id. at 59. While progressive regulation of corporations grew in the twentieth
century, corporate law limits withdrew. From the 1890s to 1930s, “[t]he function of corporation law
[in the United States became] to enable businessmen to act, not to police their action.” Id. at 70.
15
VOGEL, supra note 12, at 1–3.
16
YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
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deference of administrations, legislatures, and courts to the needs of
business.”17 These processes of legitimation can go both ways. Business
also legitimates law through passive compliance and active support. This
phenomenon is particularly salient at the transnational level where public
institutions are weak and may seek allies with business. For example,
rather than enacting binding legal norms, the United Nations, through its
Global Compact, attempts to find partners within business to help to align
business conduct with “universally accepted principles in the areas of
human rights, labour, environment, and anti-corruption.”18 The Global
Compact will only have relevance if businesses voluntarily agree to join it.
A. Business and Legislation
Legislators may respond to business demands for many reasons,
ranging from self-interest in campaign support, a desire not to harm
business in light of business’s importance for the economy, and persuasion
based on information that business provides.19 Organized businesses enjoy
significant advantages in the legislative process over other constituencies
because of their monetary and organizational resources, arguably
facilitated in the United States by its traditionally pro-business ideological
orientation.20 They can fund political campaigns, hire well-connected
lobbyists, create think tanks to circulate business-friendly ideas, access the
media, and promote the exchange of their personnel into government
positions. Because of these resources, organized businesses tend to have
preferential access to the political process so that legislators take account
of their views.21
Business interests have long held a preferential position in lawmaking
for structural reasons. Their importance for investment and employment in
capitalist economies provides them with a privileged position in dealings
ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 98 (1996).
17
CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD’S POLITICAL ECONOMIC
SYSTEMS 179 (1977); see Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and Its
Users, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 1369, 1399–1401 (2006) (discussing how “[i]n the past thirty years the
business corporation has achieved an ascendancy over government entities . . .”).
18
United Nations, Overview of the UN Global Compact, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/About
TheGC/index.html (last visited June 2, 2009). I thank Fabrizio Cafaggi for our discussion on this point.
19
The extent to which they do so depends on “a large number of factors—among them the nature
of the issue, the nature of the demand, the structure of political competition, and the distribution of
resources . . . .” KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 317 (1986); see also DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND
PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 17–21 (1991) (discussing the complex and unpredictable
relationship between interest groups and legislators).
20
LINDBLOM, supra note 17, at 172, 174; Kevin Farnsworth & Chris Holden, The Business-Social
Policy Nexus: Corporate Power and Corporate Inputs into Social Policy, 35 J. SOC. POL’Y 473, 475
(2006).
21
David Vogel, The Power of Business in America: A Re-Appraisal, 13 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 19, 29
(1983); Farnsworth & Holden, supra note 20, at 475–76.
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with government, since critical market functions such as jobs, prices,
production, growth, standard of living, and economic security depend on
business activity.22 Government thus has incentives to facilitate business
performance by providing business with benefits, including tax breaks,
The globalization of
subsidies, or business-favorable regulation.23
production arguably “enhances the structural power of corporate capital”
because business can threaten to invest elsewhere if national regulation is
unfavorable.24 During financial crises, some businesses can be deemed too
big and too important to fail.25
Political representatives nonetheless respond to popular concerns
regarding business power, the intensity of which varies over time. In the
United States, the regulatory state grew significantly during the New Deal
in the 1930s, in response to the public interest movement of the 1970s, and
may well do so in light of the global financial crisis that exploded in 2008.
Yet when faced with potentially constraining regulation, business lobbying
can produce compromises that safeguard business interests, such as the
inclusion of exceptions, loopholes, and open-ended language subject to
subsequent interpretation. In some cases, “public interest” statutes may
serve as a facade, providing a symbol of government concern while
masking government inaction.26
B. Business and Administration
Statutes often contain language that is sufficiently ambiguous so that
their application depends on which parties mobilize the law to advance
their ends before administrative agencies. There is a large literature,
including that of public choice in law-and-economics, debating whether
agencies are “captured” or “co-opted” by special interests, and, in
particular, business interests.27 While it is an overstatement to maintain
22

LINDBLOM, supra note 17, at 172.
Id. at 174.
24
DAVID HELD, ANTHONY MCGREW, DAVID GOLDBLATT & JONATHAN PERRATON, GLOBAL
TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE 270, 281 (1999); DANI RODRIK, HAS
GLOBALIZATION GONE TOO FAR? 44–45 (1997).
25
See, e.g., GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK
BAILOUTS 1 (2004) (“These banks have assumed the title of ‘too big to fail’ (TBTF), a term describing
the receipt of discretionary government support by a bank’s uninsured creditors . . . .”); David Reiss,
The Federal Government’s Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Obligations: Uncle
Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1050 (2008) (“The term ‘Too Big to Fail’ refers to a
policy where a government chooses to intervene in the market and bail out insolvent institutions instead
of letting them unwind their affairs through normal channels, such as the bankruptcy courts.”); Edmund
L. Andrews, Battles over Reform Plan Lie Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2009, at B1 (referring to
companies as “too big to fail”); Thomas L. Friedman, The Price Is Not Right, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1,
2009, at A31 (referring to companies as “too big to fail”).
26
MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 150 (2d ed. 1985); MURRAY EDELMAN,
POLITICS AS SYMBOLIC ACTION: MASS AROUSAL AND QUIESCENCE 36–38 (1971).
27
Cf. ROGER G. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE ASH COUNCIL
PROPOSALS 15 (1971) (finding that agencies sometimes choose to pursue other objectives at the
23
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that business simply captures agencies, most agree that agencies are
subject to significant business pressure and influence, and that business
often occupies a privileged position. Explanations for business’s influence
range from sociological, with regulators learning to think like the regulated
through constant interaction with them, to interest-based, where it is in the
regulators’ interest to accommodate business to avoid adverse
consequences, such as contestation before legislative committees and the
courts.
Well-organized business groups can sometimes shape the
application of regulation that is nominally designed to protect a public
interest (e.g., clean air) to suit producer interests (e.g., the producers of
“dirty coal”).29 Business groups can also press legislatures to thwart
regulation that business does not favor, including through threats to limit
agency funding for relevant programs.30 Administrative law ultimately can
be viewed as a negotiated legal order in which public officials and private
actors must coordinate if public goals are to be realized.31
Representatives of organized interests are in constant contact with
agency officials, and the two sides have opportunities to exercise influence
over each other. Regulatory officials deploy “soft” persuasive mechanisms
and threaten “hard” enforcement to affect business conduct.32
Reciprocally, even lower-level officials who see their specialized position
as technocratic can have their views shaped over time through regular
interaction with business representatives and the information that business
provides.33
A “revolving door” political culture also furthers business’s access to
administrative lawmaking and application. In the United States, business
is often able to obtain the appointment of supportive political appointees to

expense of the public interest); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON.
& MGMT. SCI. 335, 335–36 (1974) (asserting that regulations respond to the demands of interest
groups).
28
JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 359 (1980).
29
See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR: OR HOW
THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-SULFUR COAL
PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT 79 (1981) (showing how a business coalition
successfully lobbied for regulatory change at the expense of the public interest).
30
See CINDY SKRZYCKI, THE REGULATORS: ANONYMOUS POWER BROKERS IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 106–07 (2003) (stating that Congress withholds federal funding as a tactic to impede
regulation); PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 176 (1981)
(discussing pro-business budgetary incentives).
31
Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547 (2000).
32
Keith Hawkins, Bargain and Bluff: Compliance Strategy and Deterrence in the Enforcement of
Regulation, 5 LAW & POL’Y Q. 35, 40–41 (1983); Robert A. Kagan, Neil Gunningham & Dorothy
Thornton, Explaining Corporate Environmental Performance: How Does Regulation Matter?, 37 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 51, 61–62 (2003); see IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 19 (1992).
33
See Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power:
Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 277–78 (2004) (stating
that the best source of information for government regulators is from the very firms that they regulate).
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34

lead governmental agencies. More generally, lawyers and lobbyists in
Washington, D.C. enhance their resumes by splashing a few years in public
life to subsequently—and lucratively—serve private commercial clients.
As former United States Trade Representative Robert Strauss observed,
lawyers often go to work for the U.S. Government because “they know that
[government work] enables them to move on out in a few years and
become associated with a lobbying or law firm [where] their services are in
tremendous demand.”35 Whether or not regulators accommodate business
to prop their own career prospects, a “revolving door” political culture
forges understanding among public and private representatives so that each
side better appreciates the other’s perspectives and needs.
C. Business and the Courts
By initiating and defending cases, litigants shape the law’s
application, interpretation, and elaboration over time.36 Even where a
statute or administrative regulation does not favor business, business can
attempt to mobilize litigation and dispute settlement resources to build
favorable judicial precedent. Just as in political and administrative
processes, well-resourced actors have advantages. To start, organized
businesses benefit from economies of scale because of their experience
with litigation. They also tend to have greater financial resources, which
they use to attract the best lawyers to gather evidence and put forward legal
arguments. Corporate in-house counsel can hire leading external law firms
that employ scores of legal associates to scour statutes and jurisprudence
and develop sophisticated factual and legal arguments. As John Heinz and
Edward Laummann showed, legal “fields serving big business clients” are
at the top in ranking of prestige, and “those serving individual clients . . . at
the bottom.”37 Corporate legal counsel can also deploy procedural
34
See SKRZYCKI, supra note 30, at 84 (discussing the industry background of the top appointees
of the Labor Department’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration during the Clinton and
George W. Bush administrations).
35
Jill Abramson, The Business of Persuasion Thrives in Nation’s Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29,
1998, at A1 (quoting Strauss).
36
Donald J. Black, The Mobilization of Law, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 125, 147 (1973); STUART A.
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 4–5
(1974). Although this is clearly true in common law systems, it is also arguably the case in civil law
systems where judges and legal scholars refer to judicial decisions as regarding the law’s meaning and
give weight to them, which helps to preserve legal certainty and consistency. See, e.g., Mauro
Cappelletti, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Civil Law: A Fundamental Difference—Or No
Difference at All?, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KONRAD ZWEIGERT ZUM 70 GEBURTSTAG 388, 392 (Herbert
Bernstein, Ulrich Drobnig & Hein Kötz eds., 1981) (“[T]here is no sharp cleavage between the two
major legal traditions, not even to the topic [stare decisis] discussed in this article.”).
37
JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF
THE BAR 127 (1982). Law firms have grown significantly in size, as have litigation expenses, favoring
those with greater resources. MARC GALANTER & TOM PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 4–5 (1991).
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mechanisms to draw out litigation and impose costs on less-resourced
parties to induce favorable settlements. These advantages can be
countered, in part, where mechanisms exist—such as attorney fee awards
and class action lawsuits—which incentivize attorneys to bring lawsuits on
Yet
behalf of consumers, investors, and other constituencies.38
corporations’ resources and experience generally provide them with
significant advantages over individuals.
Moreover, business can attempt to use soft law processes, such as
through the American Law Institute which compiles “restatements” of the
existing state of law, where business has been less successful before
legislatures.39 Similarly, business has funded research institutes, including
some within law schools, which have challenged, directly or indirectly, the
rationale for regulation. To give an example, Henry Manne’s Law and
Economics Center at George Mason University School of Law created a
program for judges that was viewed by many as being pro-business and
anti-regulation and which was dubbed by Arthur Leff as “Henry Manne’s
summer indoctrination session.”40 A large percentage of the federal
judiciary has attended it.41 In these ways, business aims to affect
subsequent legal interpretation by courts over time.
Marc Galanter has theorized the limited prospects of social change
through adjudication in his classic work, Why the “Haves” Come Out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change.42 As Galanter states,
certain actors are more likely to be “repeat players” in litigation. These
repeat players do not use the adjudicative process solely for the
adjudication of single, unrelated cases; they also play for rules. As repeat
players, they are well-positioned to settle unfavorable cases and litigate
and appeal cases that are more likely to result in a favorable legal
precedent. By selecting which cases to settle and thus extract them from
38
These attorneys also have their own interests, complicating the assessment of the costs and
benefits of these mechanisms. For an empirical assessment of the use of contingency fees, see Herbert
M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASH. U. LAW Q. 739, 744–47
(2002).
39
See Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
743, 782, 784–85 (1993) (describing lobbying efforts by the ALI); see also Alex Elson, The Case for
an In-Depth Study of the American Law Institute, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 625, 625 (1998) (noting the
ALI’s general contributions to the development of the law). David Snyder likewise notes how the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws also acts as a de facto private
legislator. Snyder, supra note 11, at 378–82.
40
Arthur Allen Leff, Commentary, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism,
60 VA. L. REV. 451, 452 (1974).
41
See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 360 (2001) (“[B]y 1983, over
one-third of the federal judiciary had attended it at least once.”); see also Law and Economics Center,
http://www.lawecon.org/about (last visited July 8, 2009) (noting attendance by “more than 5,000
judges”).
42
See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 95 (1974) (maintaining that the legal system’s structure inhibits
change).
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the adjudicative process, repeat players are better positioned to reduce the
likelihood of adverse precedent affecting their future operations.43 Even
where subsequent legislation overturns a judicial precedent favorable to a
repeat player, such new legislation triggers a new process of legal
interpretation where well-resourced repeat players are favored.
Galanter defines a repeat player as a “larger unit . . . which has had and
anticipates repeated litigation, which has low stakes in the outcome of any
one case, and which has the resources to pursue its long-run interests.”44
He defines a “one-shotter,” in contrast, as a smaller unit whose stakes in a
given case are high relative to the actor’s total worth.45 One-shotters, as a
result, are more likely to focus on the particular result from settling a
dispute rather than the creation of long-term precedent affecting future
operations. Galanter finds that “organizations roughly correspond to
[repeat players],” whether the organizations be a business or government
actor.46
Catherine Albiston has examined how businesses have strategically
used litigation to shape the interpretation of aspects of employment law
over time. Applying Galanter’s framework, she finds that “[e]mployers
may settle strong cases likely to produce adverse decisions, ensuring that
these cases never become the basis for a published judicial opinion[,]”
while they “may dispose of weak cases . . . through motions to dismiss or
motions for summary judgment, which often do become part of the judicial
She finds that “published judicial
interpretation of the law.”47
determinations of rights . . . occur primarily when employers win[,]”48
which affects understandings of law in subsequent employment disputes.
Employees’ successful settlements come “at the price of silence in the
historical record of the common law.”49
In the United States, businesses have successfully used litigation to be
recognized as “persons” benefiting from constitutional rights, such as
involving search and seizure, free speech, and campaign finance, as
opposed to mere instruments of natural persons. Carl Mayer characterized
Supreme Court decisions recognizing constitutional rights protections for
corporations against government action as symbolic of “the transformation
of our constitutional system from one of individual freedoms to one of
43
See id. at 103 (describing how repeat players utilize experience to reach favorable litigation
results).
44
Id. at 97–98.
45
See Marc Galanter, Afterword, Explaining Litigation, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 347, 347 (1975)
(describing “one-shotters”).
46
Id. at 348; see Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead, supra note 42, at 97, 113
(discussing businesses and bureaucracies as repeat players).
47
Catherine Albiston, The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The Paradox of Losing by
Winning, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 894 (1999).
48
Id. at 902.
49
Id. at 906.
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50

organizational prerogatives.”
In contrast, although there have been
stirrings of some change, corporations have remained relatively “immune
from criminal punishment” because criminal laws are typically designed in
contemplation of natural persons.51
D. Negotiation in the Law’s Shadow
Reading statutes, administrative regulations, and judicial decisions tells
us little about the law’s operation. As socio-legal scholars have long
shown, there is a difference between the law in the books (whether in
statutes or published judicial decisions) and the law in practice, what they
refer to as the “gap.”52 Only a few disputes are fully litigated. Most are
settled through negotiation. As Galanter reminds us, “the career of most
cases does not lead to full-blown trial and adjudication but consists of
negotiation and maneuver in the strategic pursuit of settlement through
Galanter calls this process
mobilization of the court process.”53
“litigotiation.”54
Two primary aspects of the law exercise shadow effects on bargaining:
the law’s substance and the law’s procedures. The substance of law, as set
forth in statutes and administrative regulations and as interpreted in case
law, can inform and constrain settlement negotiations conducted in the
law’s shadow. As Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser observe in their
famous study of divorce law, “the outcome that the law will impose if no
agreement is reached gives each [party] certain bargaining chips—an
endowment of sorts.”55 Those more legally astute are more likely to be
aware of the bargaining chips that they may deploy in order to use them
strategically to their advantage. Repeat players in dispute settlement who
can “play for rules” may also affect the very nature of the bargaining chips.
The judicial decision itself may be viewed in terms of its “shadow
effect” on the resolution of a dispute. Negotiations may take place in the
50
Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS
L.J. 577, 578 (1990).
51
Marc Galanter, Comment, Farther Along, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1113, 1118 (1999).
52
See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 22 (1979) (demonstrating the gap between law “on the books” and its
implementation in criminal justice system); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business:
A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 56 (1963) (documenting differences between written
contracts and actual practices followed by parties); Robin Stryker, Mind the Gap: Law, Institutional
Analysis and Socioeconomics, 1 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 335, 358–59 (2003) (concluding with a discussion
of institutions generally).
53
Marc Galanter, Contract in Court; or Almost Everything You May or May Not Want to Know
About Contract Litigation, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 577, 596 (2001).
54
Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach about Legal Process, 34 J. LEG.
EDUC. 268, 268 (1984).
55
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979). But see Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business,
supra note 52, at 63–64 (regarding the role of non-legal norms in the settlement of business disputes).
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context of, and be informed by, a judicial decision. As Stewart Macaulay
writes regarding contract law, “[w]hat appears to be a final judgment at the
trial level may be only a step toward settlement. The judgment may affect
the balance of power between the parties, but often it will not go into effect
as written.”56 Parties can settle the dispute in the shadow of a potential
appeal, or they can settle it in light of their ongoing business relations with
each other and third parties.
In addition, the law’s “shadow” effects include the costs of deploying
the law procedurally. As Herbert Kritzer states, “the ability to impose
costs on the [opponent] . . . and the . . . capacities for absorbing costs”
affect how the law operates.57 Where large businesses can absorb high
litigation costs by dragging out a case, while imposing them on weaker
complainants, they can seriously constrain a person’s incentives to initiate
a claim, and correspondingly enhance a person’s incentives to settle a
dispute unfavorably.58 Law casts a weaker shadow for parties that lack the
ability to hire and retain skilled lawyers, unless there are mechanisms, such
as attorney fee awards and class actions, which create incentives for the
plaintiff’s bar. When legal resources cannot be mobilized cost-effectively,
then a party’s threat to invoke legal procedures against a business that
wields greater legal resources has less credibility. A party may not even
consider the threat of litigation, knowing the challenges that it faces. It has
less of an incentive to become aware of the state of the law, affecting what
is called in socio-legal studies its “legal consciousness.”59 These aspects of
the legal system most adversely affect individuals with fewer resources.
In sum, businesses have advantages in each of the public institutions
discussed above and can look for allies in each of them when their interests
are at stake. At times, businesses may find the legislature more favorable
to their views, at others the executive, and at others courts. Businesses can
thus search for allies in one public institution to counter or constrain
another, as will any organized constituency. These institutional processes
56
Stewart Macaulay, The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships,
Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules, 66 MOD. L. REV. 44, 71 (2003).
57
HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET’S MAKE A DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN
ORDINARY LITIGATION 73 (1991).
58
See David M. Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L.R. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer & Joel B.
Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 76 (1983) (considering litigation
from an investment standpoint).
59
See, e.g., David M. Engel, Globalization and the Decline of Legal Consciousness: Torts,
Ghosts, and Karma in Thailand, 30 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 469, 471 n.2 (2005) (“Legal consciousness in
this article refers to the practices and concepts invoked by ordinary people who have suffered injuries
and who, in the course of their subsequent narrations, discuss questions of remedy, fate, causation, and
justice.”); Elizabeth A. Hoffmann, Legal Consciousness and Dispute Resolution: Different Disputing
Behavior at Two Similar Taxicab Companies, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 691, 692–93 (2003) (“Scholars
have defined legal consciousness as how people make sense of law and legal institutions and how
people give meaning to their law-related experiences and actions.”); see also Charles Cortese, A Study
in Knowledge and Attitudes Toward the Law: The Legal Knowledge Inventory, 3 ROCKY MTN. SOC.
SCI. J. 192, 192–93 (1966) (discussing inadequate experience with and ignorance of the law).

162

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:147

interact over time, giving rise to the national public law system. This
public law system, however, is not autonomous, but is affected by
developments in the private sphere.
III. THE PRIVATE LEGAL SPHERE
Law-in-action refers to how law is received, interpreted by and
subsequently given meaning through practice—what Eugen Ehrlich called
“the living law.”60 Publicly-made law, whether formed through statute,
administrative regulation or judicial judgment, not only must be put into
action through practice; it also complements, competes and interacts with
private ordering mechanisms, affecting public law’s meaning and
application. To understand the relation of business and law, one must
examine both how business responds to publicly-made law (which we
explore in this section) and how that response can feed back into publiclymade law (which we examine in Part IV).
A. Alternative Choices for Privately-Made Law
We can view business’s response to publicly-made law in terms of
three broad approaches. First, businesses can create their own private legal
ordering regimes, which, if accepted as legitimate, can displace the
demand for publicly-made law. This approach involves a privately-made
alternative that is relatively centralized. Second, businesses can ignore
existing public law, even that in their favor, because of other concerns such
as long-term client relations and reputation. This market-oriented
alternative, in which business focuses on partner and customer relations
and social norms, is decentralized. Third, businesses can implement public
law requirements through internal organizational policies and procedures
in which they translate and potentially transform the meaning of publiclymade law. This internal organizational business alternative, in turn, may
be diffused through customary business practice to entire business sectors
and thus lies between the first two alternatives.
Through these
mechanisms, the corporate organization can act, “to varying extents, as a
legislator, adjudicator, lawyer, and constable,” and thereby constitute a
private legal system.61
60

EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 501–02 (Walter L.
Moll trans., 1936).
61
Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court: Speculations on the
Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 941, 961 (1999); Stewart Macaulay,
Private Government, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 445, 446–47 (Leon Lipson & Stanton
Wheeler eds., 1986); Snyder, supra note 11. Edelman and Suchman contend that business
organizations have internalized elements of the public legal system in at least four major ways which
interact: “(1) the legalization of organizational governance [through internal policies and procedures];
(2) the expansion of private dispute resolution; (3) the rise of in-house counsel; and (4) the reemergence of private policing.” LAUREN B. EDELMAN & MARK C. SUCHMAN, THE LEGAL LIVES OF
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Business has long created its own private legal systems, in particular to
govern commercial transactions under merchant law (or lex mercatoria).62
These private business law regimes can be national or transnational in
scope. At the national level, businesses have created standardized
contracts which effectively have become the law for sectors of industry, as
has been the case with the standards set by the American Institute of
Architects for the design and construction of buildings.63 Similarly, stock
exchanges began as relatively autonomous private organizations.64 For the
insurance sector, Lloyd’s of London syndicates were effectively
responsible for insurance law in the United Kingdom, and Lloyd’s power
extended internationally because London was the financial center for
international trade.65 Today, the credit card industry effectively sets credit
card rules for consumers and businesses on many issues.66 Business selfregulation plays a central role in international harmonization as well, as
this Article explores further in Part IV. Through business’s creation of
new institutions, such as through chambers of commerce and trade
associations, this alternative is the most centralized of the privately-made
variants.
Second, a business can simply disregard law in light of long-term
client relations and reputational concerns. As Macaulay found in his
famous study of business contracts and the settlement of business disputes,
“[t]here is a hesitancy to speak of legal rights or to threaten to sue in these
negotiations.”67 Ian Macneil elaborated these insights in developing
“relational contact” theory which postulates that social norms underpin
contractual relations so that individual contracts and contract disputes are
best viewed as “part of a relational web.”68 As Macaulay and Macneil
show, a business may not even engage with law to determine what legal
rights, claims, or defenses it may have. Non-legal sanctions, such as
damaged reputation, are available if a business does not act in good faith.
This alternative which relies on business relations and social norms is the
PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS xxv (2007). On the latter point, businesses use private police forces to patrol
their premises and oversee their workforce. It is estimated that private police outnumber public police
by 3:1. Edelman & Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court, supra, at 958.
62
LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW 1–3 (1983).
63
Macaulay, Private Government, supra note 61, at 448; W. David Slawson, Standard Form
Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529–30 (1971).
64
Snyder, supra note 11, at 385–86 (describing the stock exchanges as private legislators).
65
BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 8, at 113.
66
Snyder, supra note 11, at 398–402.
67
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business, supra note 52, at 61. See Lisa Bernstein,
Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 115, 115 (1992) (“The diamond industry has systematically rejected state-created law. In
its place, the sophisticated traders who dominate the industry have developed on elaborate, internal set
of rules, complete with distinctive institutions and sanctions, to handle disputes among industry
members.”).
68
IAN MACNEIL, THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL
18 (2001).
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most decentralized; law (in terms of formal rules, standards and
procedures) plays the most limited role.
Third, business responds to publicly-made law by creating internal
corporate organizational policies and procedures which parallel and
overlap with public law. Like the external public legal system,
organizations adopt increasingly detailed rules, policies, and programs, and
create new departments and positions to oversee regulatory compliance. In
some cases, these new programs and institutions can facilitate other
parties’ awareness and activation of the law. In other areas, they can lead
to interpretations and applications of law that neutralize the law’s
normative ambitions. In short, business internalization processes can
either expand or weaken the law’s reach.
B. The Impact of Corporate Internal Policies: Expanding and Curtailing
Law’s Reach
1. Expanding Law’s Reach
By internalizing public law norms and principles, business can further
public law’s reach. In some cases, businesses may instrumentally do so,
marketing themselves as good citizens which protect the environment and
labor rights.69 Businesses may even require their suppliers to conform to
these policies, extending their effects. In other cases, the process may be
less consciously instrumental.
Corporate internalization policies provide a particular form of
legalization. Phillip Selznick and Philippe Nonet went so far as to argue
that such legalization transforms business organizations into polities that
provide citizenship rights for their constituencies.70 Public law, for
example, spurs the creation of internal corporate rules and, in doing so, can
expand the “rights consciousness” of particular constituencies, such as
employees, reinforcing their expectations of social justice.71 Public law, in
parallel, can spur the creation of new corporate compliance personnel
69
See ASEEM PRAKASH, GREENING THE FIRM: THE POLITICS OF CORPORATE
ENVIRONMENTALISM 147 (2000) (discussing the adoption of environmental policies by private firms);
ASEEM PRAKASH & MATHEW POTOSKI, THE VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTALISTS: GREEN CLUBS, ISO
14001, AND VOLUNTARY REGULATIONS 2 (2006) (describing voluntary adoption of regulatory systems
by businesses and industries).
70
PHILIP SELZNICK, PHILIPPE NONET & HOWARD M. VOLLMER, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL
JUSTICE 229–33 (1969). For a more recent examination of how internal processes can expand law’s
reach, see Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 458, 464–65 (2001) (examining “the set of intermediate actors, operating within and
across the boundaries of the workplace, that have emerged as important players in the implementation
of workplace innovations to address bias. These nongovernmental actors are simultaneously
influencing judicial definitions of effective workplace problem solving and translating legal norms into
organizational systems and standards.”).
71
Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organization Governance: The Expansion of Due
Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1401, 1410 (1990).
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within corporations. Company employees in these positions attend
conferences on the applicable law, write memoranda on the relevant issues
which they distribute within firms, and generally increase firm awareness
of the legal issues in question. In formulating and overseeing the
implementation of company policies, they affect internal business
organizational culture, fostering company compliance with existing legal
requirements and norms even where state enforcement is weak.72
Business lawyers who defend their clients against advocates’ claims
may aid advocates’ ends in creating legal compliance procedures to avoid
legal challenge. Even if the risk of restrictions is minute, in-house lawyers
can benefit if their clients come to them for legal analysis and take that
analysis into account. In-house counsel has an interest in being respected
for its legal knowledge within the firm’s hierarchy. When consulted by the
firm’s business personnel, in-house counsel, together with employees from
the firm’s human resources division, may (unintentionally) overstate the
risks to an enterprise from non-compliance by focusing on a legal reading
of the law (as opposed to the law-in-action), its substantive requirements
and sanctions, including any draconian risks such as imprisonment of
company executives. Outside law firms and other consultants likewise
distribute to clients and prospective clients memoranda, manuals, and other
private assessments of the law in order to encourage firms to come to them
for legal advice. At symposia, they market contractual and other
precautions, which can be drafted and implemented to reduce the risk of
legal challenge. In doing so, however, they may catalyze change in
corporate practices, shaping the law-in-action.
In the field of wrongful discharge law, for example, Edelman,
Abraham, and Erlanger find:
Employer’s in-house counsel may benefit from increased
demands for their services within the firm and, like personnel
professionals, may attain power by helping to curb the
perceived threat of wrongful discharge lawsuits. . . . The
threat of wrongful discharge, then, may [also] help practicing
lawyers [of outside firms] in the field of employment law
expand the market for their services.73
They conclude that “the personnel profession, with some help from the
legal profession, has constructed the law in a way that significantly
overstates the threat it poses to employers.”74 Ironically, in providing legal
counsel to their clients on the law’s provisions and risks, in-house and
72
Frank Dobbin & John R. Sutton, The Strength of a Weak State: The Rights Revolution and the
Rise of Human Resources Management Divisions, 104 AM. J. SOC. 441, 443 (1998).
73
Lauren B. Edelman, Steven E. Abraham & Howard S. Erlanger, Professional Construction of
Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 47, 75 (1992).
74
Id. at 53.
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external business lawyers and internal human resource employees can
become unconscious abettors of the aims of otherwise underfunded and
disparate rights advocates.
Data privacy regulation provides another example of private law
regimes that complement and parallel public ones.75 In the United States,
private privacy seal programs are funded by business to adopt private
privacy codes. This is done in part to ward off public regulation by
demonstrating that business self-regulation is sufficient. Yet these private
regimes also interact with public law regimes. For example, if a business
does not comply with the rules it advertizes, it is subject to challenge by
the U.S. Federal Trade Commission for deceptive practices.76 Moreover,
through the threat of data transfer restrictions and foreign litigation under
EU law (the data privacy directive), the European Union helps raise the bar
of what a U.S. business is willing to sign. Existing public law, in this case
domestic and foreign, stimulates business demand for privacy policies and
independent certification of them, including reducing the prospect of new,
and even more constraining, public law.
Legal and other professionals serve as carriers and filters of law and
can facilitate a convergence in business practice over time. Business
policies can become isomorphic in light of professionals’ interactions, and
business’ desires to gain legitimacy through the adoption of what is
perceived to be fair governance procedures.77 In this way, business
internal policies can affect entire organizational fields through parallel
adoption of policies by individual firms. For example, internal U.S.
business policies and procedures have been constructed parallel to civil
rights laws78 and health and safety laws.79
2. Curtailing Law’s Reach
The creation of internal business policies more than simply reflects and
furthers law’s reach. In creating organizational policies and procedures,
business has an incentive to interpret public law requirements to suit
business interests in ways designed to limit regulation’s constraints. Law’s
textual ambiguities facilitate business’s opportunity to do so.
In
internalizing public law, business translates and transforms it. Corporate
75
Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International
Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2000).
76
See id. at 22–25.
77
See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism
and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 147–48 (1983); John W.
Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutional Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM.
J. SOC. 340, 348–49 (1977); see also Edelman & Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court, supra note
61, at 979; Sturm, supra note 70, at 462–64.
78
Edelman, supra note 71, at 1401–02.
79
SOCIAL REGULATION: STRATEGIES FOR REFORM 95 (Eugene Bardach & Robert A. Kagan eds.,
1982).
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internal policies and administrative procedures, for example, mimic central
legal principles of due process, but do so by displacing the intervention of
public legal authorities. Adopting internal rules allows the organization to
“symbolize compliance” and borrow the legitimacy accorded to public law,
while exercising greater control of its implementation and, in the process,
its meaning.80
Business can attempt to preempt public law by removing disputes from
external controls, such as by including mandatory arbitration provisions in
business contracts.81 Businesses have long created dispute settlement
institutions to resolve conflicts between them. Lex mercatoria, for
example, was enforced by specialized merchant courts at trade fairs in the
Middle Ages.82 In contemporary international transactions, businesses still
seek to avoid the biases and complexities of conflicts of law by avoiding
adjudication before public courts. National legal systems recognize and
enforce these private arbitration rulings.83
These mechanisms are also increasingly deployed in entirely national
settings. The U.S. Federal Arbitration Act, for example, curtails U.S.
states’ ability to limit the use and enforceability of arbitration provisions in
business contracts with consumers.84 The rise of the alternative dispute
resolution (“ADR”) movement in the United States and abroad generally
facilitates businesses’ ability to resolve disputes outside the public
domain.85
The rise of in-house counsel can also contribute to the internalization
of law by business in ways similar to how public law influences business
strategies. Since the 1970s, the number and status of in-house counsel has
grown dramatically.86 The use of in-house counsel involves lawyers in
80

Edelman & Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court, supra note 61, at 961.
Id. at 963.
See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 8, at 46; see generally Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C.
North & Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant,
Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1 (1990).
83
See Laure Leservoisier & Clifford Chance, Enforcing Arbitration Awards and Important
Conventions, in THE ARBITRATION PROCESS: COMPARATIVE LAW YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS 255, 256 (Dennis Campbell & S. Meek eds., 2002) (“One of the main advantages of
international arbitration over litigation in national courts is that, due to the existence of a number of
international conventions on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, foreign arbitral
awards are, in principle, readily enforceable in many countries.”).
84
State attempts to protect consumers from mandatory arbitration “have been rendered
substantially irrelevant by [a] series of Supreme Court decisions . . . .” EDWARD BRUNET, RICHARD E.
SPEIDEL, JEAN R. STERNLIGHT & STEPHEN J. WARE, ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT 158 (2006).
85
See Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the “Vanishing Trial”: The Growth and Impact of
“Alternative Dispute Resolution,” 1 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 843, 911 (2004) (“Confronted with
increasingly daunting litigation costs and perceived great risks, the great majority of major businesses
were led to experiment with ADR. In recent years, mediation has become a more and more popular
alternative.”).
86
See Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lawyering for a Global
Organization: The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1059 (1997) (“Between 1970
81
82
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strategic planning at an earlier stage of transactions. In-house counsel
manage businesses’ internalization of legal regimes as part of
programmatic prevention policies.88 In the process, in-house counsel can
give law more of a business orientation since in-house counsel can blend
both legal and business advice more than outside legal counsel, blurring
the distinction between doing law and doing business.89
By symbolically incorporating public requirements into internal
corporate policies, by internalizing administrative control over its routine
activities through complaint procedures, and by preempting external
intervention through private alternative dispute resolution, business can
create its own legal field which helps to legitimize business practices.
While Galanter earlier explored the ability of repeat players to exploit the
judicial process, internalizing the legislative and judicial processes
circumvents the public law system. In a reflection piece twenty-five years
after his article speculating “why the haves come out ahead,” Galanter
found that corporate internalization policies represent a “recoil against
law” in response to reduced leeway afforded to business by the public law
system.90 Internalization policies remove issues from public rule making
and adjudication. By usurping the role of external legal processes and
supplanting them with internal rules, large organizations can enhance their
ability to limit legal change.91 Under these internal systems, the “haves”
and 1980, there was a forty percent increase in the number of lawyers working in-house; and between
1980 and 1991, there was a thirty-three percent increase.”); Steven L. Schwarcz, To Make or To Buy:
In-House Lawyering and Value Creation, 33 J. CORP. L. 497, 498 (2008) (“Improvements in reputation
and skill of in-house lawyers and the recent growth of in-house legal departments mark a watershed in
legal demographics. Although a need remains for outside law firms, especially in litigation, the relative
distribution of work has changed. There has been a substantial shift towards more in-house lawyer
transactional work in the past decade, with one survey showing approximately 68% of transactions
currently lawyered in-house.”).
87
See Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37
STAN. L. REV. 277, 281 (1985) (“The very existence of a properly established inside counsel pushes
back the involvement of lawyers to an earlier phase of a transaction and shifts the mode from reactive
to proactive.”).
88
See id. (“Only in the last five years has it become systematic, structured, and formally
articulated into milestones with formal documentation.”).
89
See Robert Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: Constructing the
Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457, 464 (2000) (“Yet the
counsel role implies a broader relationship with business actors that affords counsel an opportunity to
make suggestions based on business, ethical, and situational concerns.”); Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside
Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 487
(1989) (“Inside counsel can use the information, organizational power, and trust they obtain from being
part of the client organization to participate in corporate planning, anticipating legal problems and
maintaining legal compliance.”).
90
Galanter, Farther Along, supra note 51, at 1116.
91
See Edelman & Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court, supra note 61, at 944 (“Although
‘have not’ groups may gain some short-run advantages from the introduction of legal norms into the
workplace, we contend that the organizational annexation of law subtly skews the balance between
democratic and bureaucratic tendencies in society as a whole, potentially adding to the power and
control of dominant elites.”).
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are arguably even more advantaged.

IV. DYNAMIC INTERACTION: PUBLIC LAW IN THE
SHADOW OF BUSINESS PRACTICE
Rather than being viewed as distinct, public law and business internal
policies are interpenetrated, reciprocally and dynamically affecting each
other. On the private side, private legal systems do not exist in a vacuum.
Even in domains where publicly-made law does not exist and business
creates its own private standards, business does so in the shadow of the
public law system’s potential intervention. First, the public legal system
provides default rules that apply where private standards and contracts are
incomplete.93 Second, as behavioral economists note, default rules
significantly affect behavior, whether because people consciously avoid
the transactional costs of negotiating around them, blindly follow a path of
least resistance, or are socialized to accept them as normal.94 Third, public
law can catalyze more transparent and principled decision-making within
decentralized, private “new governance” processes that fall outside of
traditional conceptions of law.95 These new governance processes operate
in the shadow of the public law system.
On the public side, public legal systems likewise can be viewed
(reciprocally) as operating in the shadow of business practice. First,
legislators can respond to private regimes by codifying them, and courts
can do so by enforcing them as exemplars of business custom or
92

Id.
See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Default Rules for Incomplete Contracts, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87
(1989) (“Default rules fill the gaps in incomplete contracts; they govern unless the parties contract
around them.”); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78
VA. L. REV. 821, 822 (1992) (“Much of what is taught as the law of contract can be conceived as
publicly provided ‘background’ rules or principles that fill the inevitable gaps in the private law made
by contracting parties.”); Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of
Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 489–90 (1989) (“These doctrines, which serve to define the exact
scope of contractual obligations, are often referred to as ‘background rules’ or ‘default rules,’ although
the term ‘default rules’ more commonly refers only to those rules which the parties are free to vary by
appropriate language in their contract.”); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for
Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 599 (1990) (noting that default rules provide a gap
filling function in contracts).
94
See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 83–87 (2008) (discussing how most people will choose whatever
option requires the least amount of effort); see also Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in
Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1583, 1586 (1998) (“Parties are likely to favor default terms . . . because [such] terms are often
correlated with inaction . . . .”).
95
See Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Rethinking the Judicial Role in New
Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 565, 566 (2007) (“Courts’ gate-keeping function places the
judiciary in a position to shape the practice of legitimacy and accountability within new governance
institutions.”); Sturm, supra note 70, at 562 (noting how courts can create general norms and incentives
which encourage employers to develop processes which comply with such norms).
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responsible business practice. For example, after the New York Stock
Exchange required corporations with listed securities to adopt Audit Board
Committees, non-listed companies also adopted them out of concern that
courts might now consider the practice to be a standard for responsible
conduct when adjudicating lawsuits against corporate directors.96 Second,
when business responds to new public regulation through adopting internal
policies and practices, business may reciprocally shape the understanding
of existing law within public institutions, including courts.97 Thus, while
legal interpretation and enforcement affect economic behavior,
organizational behavior, in turn, affects public law. The two, public and
private legal ordering, dynamically interact.
To give an example, national courts have long enforced contracts
based on customary business practices. As John Braithwaite and Peter
Drahos write, “the common law absorbed and adapted the Law
Merchant,”98 such as private business regimes pertaining to bills of
exchange, promissory notes, and letters of credit. “[S]pecialist commercial
courts . . . in England bound themselves to the principle of recognizing the
customary practices of merchants, which in turn helped to produce and
reinforce the Law Merchant.”99 In civil law countries, this customary
private law was codified in the commercial codes of Western Europe.100 In
the United States, codification took place through the model Uniform
Commercial Code which was subsequently adopted in all U.S. states but
one.101 These codes and institutional practices then spread to other parts of
the world through colonialization and a general modeling of Western
commercial law.102 However, as discussed in Part V below, when these
national public courts began to reach conflicting judgments in their
applications of the new codes, business responded with new transnational
96

BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 8, at 171.
See infra notes 98–103. From the perspective of social theory, one can distinguish the concept
of “recursivity” of public and private legal ordering used here, and the concepts of “reflexivity” and
“autopoiesis” used in the work of Niklas Luhmann and Gunther Teubner. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, THE
DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY 122 (1982) (viewing the legal system as consisting of all social
communication that contains some reference to law); see also GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN
AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 36–37 (1993) (viewing legal communication as circular and reflexive so that it
is relatively autonomous from the social order). The socio-legal account used here does not view law
as normatively closed to politics and social forces, but rather as interactive (and recursive), even while
law retains some relative autonomy. For an assessment of autopoiesis theory in this vein, see Roger
Cotterrell, The Representation of Law’s Autonomy in Autopoiesis Theory, in LAW’S NEW BOUNDARIES:
THE CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL AUTOPOIESIS 80 (Jiri Priban & David Nelken eds., 2001).
98
BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 8, at 49.
99
Id. at 65.
100
Moreover, in France, the lowest-level court for commercial matters, the Tribunal de
Commerce, is composed of lay members from the business community. Many German Länder have
created special chambers for commercial matters that include lay judges. Jurgen Basedow, The State’s
Private Law and the Economy—Commercial Law as an Amalgam of Public and Private Rule-Making,
56 AM. J. COMP. L. 703, 707–08 (2008).
101
BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 8, at 50.
102
Id. at 49–50.
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private harmonization initiatives.
In other words, public and private
ordering processes in commercial law have dynamically responded to each
other over time.
Particularly important for our analysis, internal business policies and
procedures can shape how public law is perceived, transforming its
meaning. They can do so both in terms of social practice regarding the
“law,” and in terms of formal legal interpretation by courts and
administrative bodies. To start with social processes, business practices
under internal organizational policies and procedures can affect what
individuals perceive to be the law, shaping their “legal consciousness.” As
seen in Part III, corporate compliance officers share their policies and
procedures in symposia, workshops, electronic list-serves, trade journals,
and other fora, leading to similar institutionalized practices in a field.
Edelman, Fuller, and Mara-Drita show how managerial discretion in
applying civil rights laws has transformed the way that the public views the
scope and application of civil rights laws.104 In their study of business
“diversity” policies, they find that, “as legal ideas move into managerial
and organizational arenas, law tends to become ‘managerialized,’ or
They find that
progressively infused with managerial values.”105
managerial discretion in implementing civil rights laws within
organizations reframe diversity issues to include not only gender and race,
but also issues of personality and cultural lifestyle traits, transforming the
legal ideals underlying civil rights law. These internal business laws and
practices can colonize public law by “redefining what is seen as ‘normal,’
‘reasonable,’ ‘rational,’ and ‘compliant’” in terms of internal business
grievance procedures created in response to public law.106
Turning to legal institutions, business internal policies and practices
can affect courts’ interpretation and application of public law. In the civil
rights field, internal business grievance procedures are not required by the
laws themselves, yet they can shape courts’ understandings of these laws.
Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger find, in their study of internal business
practices applying the civil rights laws, that professionals “promote a
particular compliance strategy, organizations adopt this strategy to reduce
costs and symbolize compliance, and courts adjust judicial constructions of
fairness to include these emerging organizational practices.”107 The study
finds that “courts have become more likely to defer to organizations’
grievance procedures and to consider them relevant to determinations of
103

See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
Lauren B. Edelman, Sally Riggs Fuller & Iona Mara-Drita, Diversity Rhetoric and the
Managerialization of Law, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1589, 1591, 1601 (2001).
105
Id. at 1599.
106
Edelman & Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court, supra note 61, at 963.
107
Lauren B. Edelman, Christopher Uggen & Howard S. Erlanger, The Endogeneity of Legal
Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 408, 445–47 (1999).
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108

liability.”
As Edelman and Suchman state, courts “often defer to the
results of internal hearings” and “dismiss claims of any plaintiffs who have
failed to exhaust their in-house remedies.”109 Judges in overstretched and
underfunded public law systems have incentives to do so.110 In sum, public
law is often defined in the shadow of business practice, acquiring meaning
and having effects through internal business policies and procedures.
V. BUSINESS AND LAW IN GLOBAL AND COMPARATIVE CONTEXT
Legal rules, norms, and institutions have diffused globally through
processes of colonization, economic exchange, and the growth of
international and transnational institutions. This transnational diffusion of
law interacts dynamically with national and local legal cultures so that we
cannot fully understand the relation of law and business within countries
apart from transnational processes. Yet there continues to be significant
variation in outcomes at the national level despite transnational processes
of convergence.111 This section integrates an evaluation of transnational
lawmaking and its reception within countries into our analysis of the
relation of business and law.
A. The Making of Transnational Law
Businesses play a critical role in international and transnational law,
which has spread, directly or indirectly, to most regulatory areas.112
Businesses do so through using centralized and decentralized mechanisms.
They can enlist powerful states to create international public law that
advances their interests. They can independently create transnational
private legal orders. And they can export their internal standards globally
through decentralized processes of diffusion. In their study of thirteen
areas of global business regulation, Braithwaite and Drahos found that
business actors play leading roles. They found, in particular, that “state
regulation follows industry self-regulatory practice more than the reverse .
. . .”113 In some cases, international standards simply formalize and
legitimize informal practices of large dominant businesses.114 Where
108

Id. at 409.
Edelman & Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court, supra note 61, at 965.
See NEIL KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF
RIGHTS 51–52 (2001) (describing courts’ reluctance to take complex cases because of competence and
resource limitations).
111
See, e.g., David Nelken, Culture, Legal, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY:
AMERICAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 369, 369–72 (David S. Clark ed., 2007).
112
International law traditionally refers to the law between countries. Transnational law, in
contrast, refers to the law applying across borders. Private legal orders are thus typically referred to as
forms of transnational law.
113
BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 8, at 481.
114
Id. at 492.
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harmonization occurs, it is easiest to base it on dominant business practices
in a field.
Private transnational legal orders and national public law systems
interact. Private parties have long engaged in private transnational rulemaking to facilitate cross-border transactions. These transnational private
norms are often codified by states into national law. When conflict-of-law
issues arise between different national variants, business has responded by
trying to re-harmonize the law at the international level through new
private ordering initiatives, giving rise to a “new Law Merchant.”115
Among international business organizations, the International Chamber
of Commerce (“ICC”) stands apart as the premier coordinating body on
behalf of business interests to create transnational privately-made law.116
The field of international trade finance exemplifies the ICC’s lawmaking
role. The ICC’s goal, as Janet Levit writes, is to codify “international
banking practices, as well as to facilitate and standardize developing
practices” for letters of credit used in international trade.117 The ICC has
written a set of rules known as the Uniform Customs and Practice for
Documentary Credit (“UCP”) to govern transnational letters of credit. The
ICC clarifies the interpretation of these rules through issuing hundreds of
“advisory ‘opinions.’”118 In this way, the ICC attempts to resolve
ambiguities regarding the application of the UCP in different contexts.
Most banks today will not issue letters-of-credit unless they are subject to
UCP rules.119 When exporters and importers identify the UCP as their
choice of law, national courts enforce them.120 Levit finds that national
courts do so “even in the face of a domestic statute designed for related
issues,” demonstrating the UCP’s broader normative impact in national
judicial practice.121 Similarly, the ICC periodically revises “Incoterms”
which define and interpret sales terms used in the shipment of goods,122
and which guide national courts hearing contractual disputes.123
115

TRAKMAN, supra note 62, at 3.
BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 8, at 488.
117
Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up Lawmaking Through a Pluralist Lens: The ICC Banking
Commission and the Transnational Regulation of Letters of Credit, 57 EMORY L.J. 1147, 1171 (2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
118
Id. at 1174–75.
119
Id. at 1177.
120
Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three
Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125, 141 (2005).
121
Id. at 141.
122
See Incoterms: Understanding Incoterms, http://www.iccwbo.org/incoterms/id3042/index.html
(last visited Sept. 4, 2009).
123
See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, The Law Merchant in the Modern Age: Institutional Design and
International Usages Under the CISG, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 157, 175 & n.47 (2004) (“In a variety of cases,
courts have found that when commercial parties have used terms that are defined in INCOTERMS,
have not otherwise defined the meaning of their terms in the contract, and are involved in an aspect of
international trade in which INCOTERMS are traditionally used, INCOTERMS will be incorporated
116
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International private lawmaking by business has particularly evolved
in the area of technical standard setting.124 Within the European Union, the
Comité Européen de Normalisation (“CEN”) and Comité Européen de
Normalisation Electrotechnique (“CENELEC”) are the two main bodies
for the creation of “voluntary” European standards in which the private
sector plays a central role. These standards are not internally binding on
the European member states, but they have become de facto harmonized
requirements for selling products within the European Union because of
their importance in the marketplace.125 At the international level, business
works through the International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”),
a Geneva-based non-governmental organization which is the world’s
largest producer of international standards, and in which the private sector
again plays a central role.126 European business interests are sometimes
favored within ISO because of their prior organization through CEN and
CENELEC.127 Market forces again press businesses to apply these
into the contract.”); Ch. Pamboukis, The Concept and Function of Usages in the United Nations
Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 25 J.L. & COM. 107, 127–28 (2005) (citing a ruling of a
U.S. appeals court that “[e]ven if the usage of INCOTERMS is not global, the fact that they are well
known in international trade means that they are incorporated through Art. 9(2)” of the Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods); Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International
Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 681, 689 (1996–97) (“In the field
of international commerce, private legislatures have enjoyed substantial influence. . . . They also have
developed detailed form contracts, such as the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits
and the Incoterms, that private parties widely adopt by reference and that domestic courts normally
embrace as permissible expressions of contractual intent.”).
124
See HARM SCHEPEL, THE CONSTITUTION OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: PRODUCT STANDARDS IN
THE REGULATION OF INTEGRATING MARKETS 2 (2005) (noting trade agreements and technical
standards required for the integration of markets).
125
See Giandomenico Majone, International Regulatory Cooperation: A Neo-Institutionalist
Approach, in Regulatory Cooperation and Managed Mutual Recognition: Developing a Strategic
Model, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION 596 (George Bermann, Matthias Herdegen &
Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2000) (“[T]he voluntary standards produced by the European organizations
become, de facto, binding.”). As stated in the Commission’s 1985 Bulletin:
[B]ut at the same time national authorities are obliged to recognize that products
manufactured in conformity with harmonized standards (or, provisionally, with
national standards) are presumed to conform to the “essential requirements”
established by the directive. (This signifies that the producer has the choice of not
manufacturing in conformity to the standards, but in this event, that he has an
obligation to prove that his products conform to the essential requirements of the
directive.)
COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TECHNICAL HARMONIZATION AND STANDARDS: A NEW
APPROACH 7 (1985), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/3661/01/000307_1.pdf.
126
ISO’s website provides the following statement:
ISO is a non-governmental organization that forms a bridge between the public and
private sectors. On the one hand, many of its member institutes are part of the
governmental structure of their countries, or are mandated by their government. On
the other hand, other members have their roots uniquely in the private sector, having
been set up by national partnerships of industry associations.
About ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/about.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2009).
127
See Gregory Shaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulator Goals: The Prospects and Limits of
New Approaches to Transatlantic Governance Through Mutual Recognition and Safe Harbor
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voluntary ISO standards. National courts can impose tort liability if they
fail to do so and someone is harmed.128
Business also can enroll state representatives to advance business goals
in the creation of international law. They can do so in the negotiation of
private international law treaties, like the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the International
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of
Lading. They can also do so in the elaboration of “soft law” norms, such
as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and
the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law. A common form
of regulatory export occurs where national industry associations shape the
law in a dominant state, and this law becomes the model for other states,
including through the enactment of international treaties and international
soft law guidelines. While such influence varies by industry and country,
Braithwaite and Drahos found that U.S. corporations exert more power in
the world system than corporations of other states because they can enroll
the support of the world’s most powerful state.129
Private business also enlists states to advance its interests through
public international law litigation. Corporations frequently lie behind the
claims that state representatives bring in international trade litigation.
They lobby state representatives, provide them with requisite background
factual information, and hire outside lawyers to help write the legal briefs.
As a result, most litigation before the dispute settlement system of the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) involves the formation of partnerships
between state representatives, private business interests, and the lawyers
that businesses hire.130
Finally, business can bypass states and directly lobby international
organizations. The ICC again plays a central role, as it lobbies the full
spectrum of UN organizations. It looks “for key loci of decision-making in
the globe and builds a poultice of influence around them” in order to
influence international publicly-made law.131 The ICC has been central to
international commercial law,132 tax law,133 telecommunications and ecommerce law,134 and the drafting of environmental treaties.135
Agreements, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29, 36 (2002) (stating that this prior association gives European
organizations more experience in negotiating and implementing agreements).
128
See Basedow, supra note 100, at 710.
129
BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 8, at 482.
130
GREGORY SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO
LITIGATION (2003); see also Gregory Shaffer, Michelle Ratton Sanchez & Barbara Rosenberg, The
Trials of Winning at the WTO: What Lies behind Brazil’s Success, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 383, 390,
392 (2008) (finding examples of such partnerships in Brazil).
131
BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 8, at 488.
132
Id. at 70.
133
Id. at 120 (noting in particular the creation of model tax treaties to avoid double taxation of
business).
134
Id. at 344.
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Public international law, of course, can also be used against businesses.
Non-business actors can deploy public international law to challenge
business conduct before national courts, exemplifying again how
international and national institutions interact. Human rights activists have
repeatedly brought suits under international law before U.S. courts to
challenge business conduct in third countries, such as mining in Indonesia,
oil exploration in Burma and Nigeria, and aiding and abetting the apartheid
regime in South Africa.136 The resulting national legal decisions, in turn,
become evidence of customary international law.137
These legal
challenges, in turn, spur business efforts to curtail them through new
transnational private legal ordering mechanisms138 and lobbying for new
national legislation.139 But while there is a great deal of legal scholarship
focusing on international human rights claims against corporations before
U.S. courts, transnational business law is in fact much more commonly
deployed before national courts, both in the United States and abroad.
In sum, public international law, transnational private legal ordering,
national public law, and business practice dynamically and reciprocally
interact over time. They increasingly do so as international and
transnational public and private legal ordering processes proliferate, which
in turn affect legal systems and the relation of business and law at the
national level.
B. The Reception of Transnational Law
Transnational lawmaking does not uniformly affect national legal
regimes. Legal change instead varies as a function of the configuration of
domestic interests in a regulatory area, domestic institutional structures, the
135

Id. at 273.
JEFFREY DAVIS, JUSTICE ACROSS BORDERS: THE STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN U.S.
COURTS 172–73 (2008); BETH STEPHENS, JUDITH CHOMSKY, JENNIFER GREEN, PAUL HOFFMAN &
MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 312–13 (2008).
137
See Christiana Ochoa, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of International Law: Identifying and
Defining CIL Post Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 105, 123 (2005) (“National courts and
the international courts and tribunals referred to by McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen, as well as
mechanisms like the ATCA, provide avenues through which individuals might have direct participation
in the CIL formation process.”).
138
See, e.g., Bennett Freeman, Maria B. Pica & Christopher N. Camponovo, A New Approach to
Corporate Responsibility: The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, 24 HASTINGS
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 423, 425, 430 (2001) (describing agreements among oil and mining companies,
U.K. and U.S. governments, and human rights organizations, under which companies will voluntarily
comply with human rights standards); see also Paul Schiff Berman, A Pluralist Approach to
International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 301, 314 (2007) (“Likewise, while international labor standards
are difficult to establish at the governmental level, several private companies in the apparel industry,
responding to calls for global responsibility and the setting of norms, have adopted codes of conduct
and participated in the United Nations’ Global Compact.”).
139
See Ronen Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the Contested
Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 635, 651 (2004) (“Relying on
academics, trade and commercial associations, and various selected representatives, corporations have
pursued a wide-range lobbying campaign against the very use of ATCA.”).
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role of elites, traditions of business-government relations, and differences
in legal and business culture. Legal culture refers to the attitudes and
behavior that people have and exhibit toward law and legal institutions
within a domestic system—or, as Lawrence Friedman writes, the patterns
of “when, why and where people look for help to law or to other
institutions, or just decide to ‘lump it.’”140 Business culture refers to the
patterns of norms and behavior of people and institutions in the business
world, and in particular (for our purposes) their relation to law and state
institutions.141 Although it would be myopic to reduce all behavior to
expressions of interest, one must also be careful not to reify or essentialize
culture, since both interests and cultural norms are channeled by
institutional structures which reflect political choices.142 A full picture of
how transnational lawmaking is mediated in national legal regimes must
account for the interaction of these different factors.
Domestic systems receive international law differentially, in part as a
function of domestic patterns of business-government relations. For
example, Robert Kagan’s work depicts how business-government relations
in the United States are characterized by “adversarial legalism,” which he
defines as “policymaking, policy implementation, and dispute resolution
by means of lawyer-dominated litigation.”143 Kagan finds that both
cultural and institutional factors give rise to adversarial legalism in the
United States.
He maintains that (culturally) U.S. attitudes that
governmental power should be constrained and that persons (including
corporations) should invoke the law to protect their rights and achieve their
goals further an adversarial legal culture.144 He likewise contends that
(institutionally) “adversarial legalism arises from the relative absence of
[U.S.] institutions that effectively channel contending parties and groups
into less expensive and more efficient ways of resolving disputes, ensuring
accountability, regulating business, and compensating victims of injury or
economic misfortune.”145 In such a context, business is more vigilant
regarding the domestic application of international law, unless
international law reflects U.S. law or business practice.
Within Europe, there continues to be considerable variation among
140
Lawrence M. Friedman, Is There a Modern Legal Culture?, 7 RATIO JURIS 117 (1994);
Nelken, supra note 111, at 370.
141
See Paul DiMaggio, Culture and Economy, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 27–
28 (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 1994) (explaining that within organizational studies,
“culture” refers to the “shared cognitions, values, norms, and expressive symbols” associated with a
discrete group).
142
The literature on pluralist, centralized, and corporatist political systems provides institutionaloriented explanations for national approaches to the regulation of business. See WILSON, supra note
28.
143
ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 3 (2001).
144
Id. at 15.
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legal systems, despite the harmonizing aims of the European Union.146 In a
famous article from the 1970s, Dietrich Rueschemeyer maintained that
attitudes toward law in Germany are affected by more authoritarian
traditions of rule “by an enlightened and supposedly neutral
bureaucracy.”147 He contended that lawyers within the German bar
retained a greater “reserve toward the world of business.”148 Regarding
France, Kenneth Dyson found that “state-industry relations remain notably
intertwined,” reflected in “the prevalence of members of the élite grand
corps in the top management positions of the public and private sectors,”
giving rise to “a web of patronage spanning the public-private sector
divide.”149 Laurent Cohen-Tanugi likewise contended that French society
is “sensitive to the power relations underlying a given legal framework,”150
which leads to a “quasi-exclusive attention to power, whether political or
economic, rather than to law, which is seen as either mere windowdressing or simply the result of the power relations.”151 He argued that the
French thus manifest “a fair amount of tolerance for failure to respect the
rule of law.”152
Some scholars contend that the U.S. model of adversarial legalism is
being exported globally, and in particular to Europe.153 The place of law is
certainly changing in European countries in reflection of global
competition, economic restructuring, the rise of the European Union, and
citizen demands.154 Yet, these changes, including a relative rise in the role
146
See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law
Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MODERN L. REV. 11, 11–32 (1998) (discussing the effect of European
Union policy directives in European social, legal, and philosophical contexts).
147
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Lawyers and Their Society, reprinted in EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURES
83 (Volkmar Gessner, Armin Hoeland & Csaba Varga eds., 1996).
148
Id. at 278.
149
Kenneth Dyson, Cultural Issues and the Single European Market: Barriers to Trade and
Shifting Attitudes, 64 POL. Q. 84, 93 (1993), reprinted in EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURES 387, 395
(Volkmar Gessner, Armin Hoeland & Csaba Varga eds., 1996).
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Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, The Law without the State, reprinted in EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURES
269, 270 (Volkmar Gessner, Armin Hoeland & Csaba Varga eds., 1996).
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Id.
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Id.
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Cf. generally Robert A. Kagan, Globalization and Legal Change: The “Americanization” of
European Law?, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 99 (2007) (discussing the ways in which American legal
culture has influenced European nations, while also explaining important differences between them); R.
Daniel Keleman, Suing for Europe: Adversarial Legalism and European Governance, 39 COMP. POL.
STUD. 101 (2006) (providing a conceptual framework for understanding the integration and
consequences of “adversarial legalism” in the European Union); David Levi-Faur, The Political
Economy of Legal Globalization: Juridification, Adversarial Legalism, and Responsive Regulation, 59
INT’L ORG. 451 (2005) (offering a critical analysis of theses exploring the globalization of the
American legal culture and providing a model for interdisciplinary study of global legal and regulatory
change).
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For excellent studies of developments in consumer law in Europe, see Fabrizio Cafaggi &
Hans W-Michlitz, Collective Enforcement of Consumer Law: A Framework for Comparative
Assessment, 16 EUR. REV. OF PRIVATE L. 391, 421 (2008) (“Clearly, the differences [between the U.S.
and Europe] in the role of consumer protection associated with market structures, firm sizes, the role of
the administrative state, and that of private organizations remain significant. However, the degree of
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of courts and legal processes, take place in the context of institutional path
dependencies and different legacies of government-business relations.155
Turning to Asian nations, it is often stated that people are more
reluctant to use formal legal processes than in Western nations, especially
the United States, and thus there is less adversarial legalism. Japan, for
example, has much lower litigation rates compared to the United States.
This difference has sparked debate among those stressing Japanese cultural
and institutional factors which affect the formal invocation of law.156 More
recently, the focus on cultural explanations, such as the importance of
“social harmony” and “social consensus” in Asia, has sparked charges of
Orientalism.157 Scholars today often stress institutional factors in Asia, and
how political choices determine the availability of institutions for dispute
settlement, which can change in response to new political demands.158 For
example, Thomas Ginsburg and Glenn Hoetker show how litigation rates
have risen in Japan in response to structural reforms and institutional
changes, including relaxed controls over the licensing of lawyers.159
Scholars also stress variation in Asian legal systems, including in light
consumer protection in European countries has clearly grown with European intervention.”); Fabrizio
Cafaggi & Hans W-Michlitz, Administrative and Judicial Enforcement in Consumer Protection: The
Way Forward 3–4 (EUI Working Papers LAW No. 2008/29, Nov. 1, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1317342 (“Changes are taking place [in both the
U.S. and Europe]. In Europe, the more recent trend shows an increasing effort to create public
regulators in charge of coordinating trans-border monitoring and enforcement issues with a volume of
MS [member state] legislation introducing judicial collective enforcement . . . . Another important
development in Europe is related to consumer protection for infringements of competition law. Here
there is a strong push towards judicial private enforcement driven by European institutions.”).
155
See Kagan, supra note 153, at 104 (“The American business community . . . historically has
been less deferential to government than its counterparts in England and Western Europe and far more
inclined to battle government regulation in the courts.”); see also Kelemen, supra note 153, at 120–22
(discussing the divergence in specific business-government relations between American and European
legal cultures, specifically the securities industry); Levi-Faur, supra note 153, at 453 (critiquing
Keleman and Sebitt, but agreeing that the “adversarial legalism is spreading”).
156
See Eric A. Feldman, Law, Culture and Conflict: Dispute Resolution in Postwar Japan, in
LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 50–72 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007) (assessing different approaches to
the study of dispute resolution in Japan).
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Veronica L. Taylor & Michael Pryles, The Cultures of Dispute Resolution in Asia, in DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN ASIA 1–26 (Michael Pryles ed., 2d ed. 2003) (focusing on Asia generally).
158
For assessments of dispute settlement within Japan, see J. MARK RAMSEYER, RELUCTANT
LITIGANT REVISITED: RATIONALITY AND DISPUTES IN JAPAN (1988); FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987); John Owen Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4
J. JAPANESE STUD. 359, 365–66 (1978); Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary
Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 41, 50–52 (Arthur Taylor von
Mehren ed., 1963). For assessments of dispute settlement within China, see generally MELISSA
MACAULEY, SOCIAL POWER AND LEGAL CULTURE: LITIGATION MASTERS IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA
(1998); Randall Peerenboom & Xin He, Dispute Resolution in China (La Trobe Univ. Sch. L. Legal
Studies Working Paper Series No. 2008/9, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1265116. Finally, for assessments within Korea, see generally JUDICIAL SYSTEM
TRANSFORMATION IN THE GLOBALIZING WORLD: KOREA AND JAPAN (Dai-Kwon Choi & Kahei
Rokumoto eds., 2007); Jeong-Oh Kim, The Changing Landscape of Civil Litigation, in RECENT
TRANSFORMATIONS IN KOREAN LAW AND SOCIETY 321, 322–23 (Dae-Kyu Yoon ed., 2000).
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Analysis of Japan’s Turn to Litigation, 35 J. LEG. STUD. 31 (2006).
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of contemporary pressures leading to changes in the role of law and courts.
Rapid economic development, followed by the bursting of the Japanese
economic bubble and the 1997 Asian financial crisis, has significantly
affected the role of law for business. China has moved dynamically
toward a market economy, and has developed “new structures and
processes for resolving disputes,” and, in particular, commercial ones.160
In India, where courts are plagued by a large backlog of cases, frequent
adjournments and long delays, companies have increasingly sought to
resolve legal disputes through alternative dispute resolution processes,
including arbitration. Yet these processes also have given rise to delay,
backlog, and frustration, spurring new reform efforts.161 In many less
developed Asian countries, courts and formal law have not held as
prominent a position, in part because these countries have other political
and economic priorities, and in part because of the impact of corruption
and authoritarian rule.162 Yet these systems also change in light of
transnational pressures mediated through domestic institutional patterns of
governance.
The diffusion of transnational corporate bankruptcy law exemplifies
both how transnational law matters within domestic legal systems and how
it is differentially received. Terence Halliday and Bruce Carruthers have
done path-breaking field work at the international and national levels in
this area.163 From this work, they have developed the following theory:
[G]lobalization of law can be expressed through a complex
set of three cycles: (1) at the national level through recursive
cycles of lawmaking and law implementation, (2) at the
160

See, e.g., PITMAN B. POTTER, THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: GLOBALIZATION AND LOCAL
LEGAL CULTURE 26 (2001); see also Peerenboom & He, supra note 158, at 28–30 (explaining
emerging trends and patterns of dispute resolution in China).
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See Jayanth K. Krishnan, Outsourcing and the Globalizing Legal Profession, 48 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 2189, 2219–32 (2007) (discussing problems of adjudication in India and analyzing attempts at
reform).
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See Randall Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW:
THEORIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S 1, 26
(Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004) (identifying problems common to Asian countries’ judicial systems,
including impaired access to justice, inefficient and expensive courts, corruption and incompetence);
see also Bruce G. Carruthers & Terence C. Halliday, Negotiating Globalization: Global Scripts and
Intermediation in the Construction of Asian Insolvency Regimes, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 521, 544
(2006) (noting “historic irrelevance of law and the courts as institutions of market regulation, and hence
the ineptness of current courts and their vulnerability to corruption”); Keith E. Henderson, Global
Lessons and Best Practices: Corruption and Judicial Independence—A Framework for an Annual State
of the Judiciary Report, in INDEPENDENCE, ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE JUDICIARY 439, 451 (Guy
Canivet, Mads Andenas & Duncan Fairgrieve eds., 2006) (finding judicial corruption in eighteen of
twenty-three countries surveyed).
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See TERENCE C. HALLIDAY & BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS, BANKRUPT: GLOBAL LAWMAKING
AND SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009); Bruce G. Carruthers & Terrence C. Halliday, The
Recursivity of Law: Global Norm-Making and National Law-Making in the Globalization of Corporate
Insolvency Regimes, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1135, 1137–38 (2007); Carruthers & Halliday, Negotiating
Globalization, supra note 162, at 523.
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global level through iterative cycles of norm making, and (3)
at an intersection of the two where national experiences
influence global norm making and global norms constrain
national lawmaking, in an asymmetric but mutual fashion.164
They show how bankruptcy law prescribed at the international level is
resisted at the local level, in particular by corporate debtors, resulting in
failed reforms. They find that strategies at the international level change in
response to national implementation challenges. In the bankruptcy law
context, the locus of international reform efforts has shifted among
international institutions, from the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”),
the World Bank, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, to the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (“UNCITRAL”). Developing countries consider UNCITRAL to be
more “legitimate” because it is part of the United Nations system and they
are better represented within it. For this reason, Halliday and Carruthers
find that UNCITRAL is potentially more effective. These institutions
bring together not only representatives from states and international
institutions, but also interested professionals, such as bankruptcy lawyers
and accountants, diffusing the norms of a transnational epistemic
community of practitioners.165
Halliday and Carruthers examine the different types of mechanisms
used to diffuse international bankruptcy norms within Asian states.
Coercive measures (such as IMF loan conditionality) have been more
effective in Indonesia than in Korea and China. International institutions
also had greater leverage over Korea than China during the Asian financial
crisis, but Korea was more likely to require persuasion to adopt legal
change than was Indonesia. In contrast, change was most likely to occur in
China through Chinese modeling of reforms based on others’ practices and
experiences. In each case, national legal change occurred in light of
transnational developments. Yet the impacts varied in light of the
transnational mechanisms used, which in turn reflected the country’s
position of relative power in relation to international institutions and other
states.166
Halliday and Carruthers also show how the reception of international
harmonization efforts is affected by different interests and institutional
legacies at the national level. They find that the reception of transnational
bankruptcy law reform is affected by the fact that different actors (and, in
164
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The Recursivity of Law, supra note 163, at 1156, 1162–67; Carruthers & Halliday, Negotiating
Globalization, supra note 162, at 566.
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particular, different business interests) participate in struggles over national
implementation than in international lawmaking.167 These domestic actors
can block the effectiveness of bankruptcy reform efforts, including by
taking advantage of the indeterminacy of international law and internal
contradictions within it that reflect compromises made during its
negotiation. In the case of Indonesia, even though Indonesia was in a weak
position in relation to the IMF, the bankruptcy reform efforts that
Indonesia enacted were often thwarted in practice because of the resistance
of powerful Indonesian business interests.168 Change in bankruptcy law in
all three countries occurred dynamically in response to transnational
processes, but the actual law-in-action continues to diverge in reflection of
different articulations of business interests, national institutions, and legal
traditions, as well as the relative susceptibility of the state to transnational
pressures.
In an era of economic and cultural globalization, even when law is
harmonized at the international level, the impact varies significantly.
Transnational lawmaking acts as an “irritant” within domestic systems.169
It provides new tools of leverage for domestic actors who desire reform,
potentially unsettling traditional political, business, and legal practices.
Yet different national institutional structures and cultural norms mediate
international law’s reception, producing variations in each country.
Although business can exercise considerable influence in international and
transnational lawmaking, which can, in turn, feed back into national law,
the results continue to vary at the national level in light of national legal
and business cultures, institutional structures and configurations of
domestic interests. National law is not static, and it responds to
transnational lawmaking initiatives, but it continues to diverge in light of
the interaction of transnational legal orders with disparate domestic legal
systems.
VI. CONCLUSION
Business and law have a complex relationship. They operate, in part,
autonomously from each other, and, in part, in response to one another. To
understand the relation of business and law, one must assess business
influence on the formation and application of publicly-made law through
legislatures, administrative bodies and courts. One must also examine
167

See Carruthers & Halliday, Negotiating Globalization, supra note 162, at 571–72 (stating that
different actors take part in the enactment and implementation stages of reform).
168
See Carruthers & Halliday, The Recursivity of Law, supra note 163, at 1157 (noting resistance
by allies of the private sector in an effort to protect domestic corporations and creditors).
169
For example, Gunther Teubner writes, “[l]egal irritants cannot be domesticated; they are not
transformed from something alien into something familiar, not adapted to a new cultural context, rather
they will unleash an evolutionary dynamic in which the external rule’s meaning will be reconstructed
and the internal context will undergo fundamental change.” Teubner, supra note 146, at 12.
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business’s creation and application of private legal systems, whether to
preempt public law, exit from public law, or internalize and, in the process,
translate and transform public law. One then needs to assess the dynamic
and reciprocal interaction of these public and private legal systems in
different national and transnational contexts. Although public and private
lawmaking for most regulatory fields has spread to the international level,
its domestic implementation varies considerably in light of ongoing
differences in the relative power of business, government and law at the
domestic level, as well as differences in local institutional structures and
business and legal cultures.
Overall, the relationship of business and law is best viewed in terms of
three sets of institutional interactions: the interaction among public
institutions (legislative, administrative, and judicial), in each of which
business plays a critical role; the interaction of national and transnational
legal processes, with transnational processes having become more
prominent in an economically and culturally interconnected age; and the
interaction among these public lawmaking processes and parallel private
rulemaking, administrative and dispute settlement institutions and
mechanisms that business creates. It is these dynamic, reciprocal
interactions that constitute the legal field in which business operates.

